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W 
ithin Aristotle’s categories, primary substances 
are conceived to exist separate from the properties 
that describe or comprise them. By formulating 
substance and property as such, Aristotle revives 
the epistemic tool, forgone in Plato’s days, of observation. How-
ever, he threatens its renewed relevance when he fails to give an 
adequate demonstration of how observation may determine the 
definitions of substances—namely, how one may distinguish es-
sential from accidental properties. Thus, my task is to save Aris-
totle’s epistemology by conceiving a new understanding of es-
sential and accidental properties, one that, if successful, will rein-
force the importance of observation in our exploration of con-
cepts. 
 In this paper, I address what I deem a crucial epistemic con-
cern underlying Aristotle’s concepts of substance and property. 
However, before I begin, let us consider two basic tenets of his 
beliefs. Firstly, unlike Plato, whose interests lie in the abstract 
Forms, Aristotle emphasizes primary substances—objects of the 
material world—to which everything else categorically belongs. 
A certain shape, size, and softness are properties belonging to an 
individual bed, for instance; virtue is a property belonging to 
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that particular object which is virtuous. Secondly, among proper-
ties belonging to primary substances, he distinguishes those cate-
gorically comprising a substance’s account, known as essential 
properties and necessarily belonging to a substance, from those 
he claims to arise from coincidence—namely accidental proper-
ties—which do not comprise a substance’s definition.   
 Given these distinctions, it seems that we need only recog-
nize essential properties, necessary to describe the essential na-
tures of substances, in order to attain knowledge of the material 
world. However, the question now arises: How does one distin-
guish essential properties from accidental properties? After all, 
Aristotle leaves much to be desired in addressing this question. 
Within Posterior Analytics, he describes four cases where A is 
essential to the description of B and thus ‘belongs to B in its own 
right’: 
 
 A) A is a necessary component of B, such as a point in a line. 
 B) A is a necessary component of B and B itself is necessary to 
      describe A, such as straightness in a line. 
 C) The account A of a substance B exclusively describes B.  
 D) A is a necessary component of B simply because of B itself.  
      For instance, an animal must be killed in order to be            
       sacrificed and “it was not a coincidence that the animal 
      was killed in being sacrificed.”1  
 
 In summary, A represents a definitional element of B whose 
essence is already known.  However, while these conditions al-
low us to define the essential properties of mathematical or geo-
metrical elements—substances known a priori—they do little to 
explain how properties comprising the definitions of ordinary 
substances and known empirically may be recognized if their 
definitions are yet undiscovered. In other words, the justification 
for a property’s essentiality cannot be verified until the definition 
is known; however, the definition cannot be known without hav-
ing determined the substance’s essential properties—we are led 
full circle.  Thus, the purpose of this paper is to address these 
concerns by exploring two possible responses to the epistemic 
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question of how we recognize essential properties, and evaluat-
ing Aristotle’s possible reply to each. Following this, I plan to 
formulate my own understanding of essential properties in order 
that Aristotle’s classification of properties may retain its epistem-




 The first response that I shall consider invokes what I con-
ceive as and call the statistical argument. It states that essential 
properties are simply more present among the total population 
of considered objects than accidental properties, and if one de-
sires to know the essences of things, one needs only determine 
which properties are more prevalent by means of statistical tech-
niques. 
 However, several problems immediately occur with this re-
sponse. First, how should one understand the condition of 
‘more’? To be clear, the term certainly should not imply an irrele-
vant difference in prevalence, since to allow such loose interpre-
tation would be to trivialize the distinction between essential and 
accidental properties. Rather, I should say that the difference in 
prevalence must be shown to be statistically significant—in other 
words, we must have high confidence by means of calculations 
that properties deemed essential are consistently and definitively 
more present in the total population. Thus, we would have both 
a nontrivial and empirical means of determining the essential 
properties of substances. 
 However, can this reply adequately appease the skeptic? 
Consider the following case: Suppose that 99% of cows are black 
and white, and 1% of cows are purple, where the purple cows 
are located on an island removed from the rest of the world. By 
statistical reasoning, we may believe that black and white is an 
essential feature of the cow, not only because it is more preva-
lent, but also because it is more prevalent in a statistically signifi-
cant sense. Now imagine that some unforeseen event kills all 
black and white cows but spares the purple cows.  According to 
the statistical argument, any person desiring to know the essence 
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of the cow, following the disaster and by valid statistical meth-
ods, would be justified in considering purple to be an essential 
feature of cows. However, at a previous time, one would have 
said an essential feature of cows was their black and white color-
ation. Therefore, if the essence of a cow is as unchanging as Aris-
totle claims in that “it will not be possible for the same thing to 
be and not to be,” the statistical argument cannot be a valid 
means by which to determine essential properties.1 
 There are two ways in which Aristotle might attempt to save 
this response in order to satisfy the epistemic challenge. First, he 
might offer a classificatory scheme that allows both for purple to 
be an essential feature of purple cows, and for purple cows to 
still be cows whose essential properties do not include purple. 
For instance, the cow might be what he calls the ‘secondary sub-
stance’: “The species in which the things primarily called 
[primary] substances belong.”1  Purple cows would thus consti-
tute the ‘primary substances’ whose color purple would indeed 
be an essential property of purple cows, while black-and-white 
would represent an essential property of black-and-white cows. 
Given this classification, there would be no contradiction in the 
above case since purple cows and black-and-white cows would 
be entirely different primary substances—entirely different indi-
vidual things—altogether, both within the larger category of 
cow. 
 However, I believe this response does not satisfy the real ep-
istemic concern: for the person who has never seen or known a 
black-and-white cow before and who is unaware that the genus 
cow may be divided into purple cows and black-and-white cows, 
a cow is purple. To him or her, that species of purple cow is not a 
subclass of cow, but rather the cow itself. Once again, we face a 
contradiction, since those who had only known black-and-white 
cows to exist in a previous time would have, according to the 
statistical argument, been compelled to conclude that black-and-
white represented an essential property of the cow. Thus, if we 
concede purple to also be an essential property, it appears that 
no epistemically objective or, more importantly, unchanging fact 
of the matter would exist—it would just so happen by chance 
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that the cow has certain ‘essential’ features because of one’s epis-
temic circumstances. 
 Here we consider Aristotle’s second attempt to save the sta-
tistical argument. He might simply regard the person, for whom 
purple is an essential property of the cow, to be wrong. In other 
words, he might insist that there is an epistemically objective fact 
of the matter: black-and-white, or no color at all, is an essential 
feature of the cow, and he who thinks otherwise is mistaken. 
However, to Aristotle, I would reply that even if the person is 
wrong, he cannot know he is wrong if essential features are 
simply defined as those properties which are statistically more 
present. If one considers the epistemic question at hand of how 
we recognize essential properties, it appears that the statistical 
distinction between essential and accidental properties is too 
shallow and must be revised if we are to  suppose an epistemi-




 A second response that I shall consider involves what I call 
the functional argument—a response most like Aristotle’s own 
view—which identifies essential properties as those helpful to 
achieving the substance’s ‘end’ or ‘function’. In this section, I will 
discuss what I consider a key weakness in this approach; howev-
er, before I begin, let us first clarify certain points of Aristotle’s 
physics.   
 According to Aristotle, in order to have knowledge of sub-
stances—to know why things are so—we must possess explana-
tions arising from four causes: 1) A material cause that explains 
the substance’s properties in terms of its constituents and materi-
al parts; 2) A formal cause that invokes as explanation a sub-
stance’s essential nature and essential properties; 3) An efficient 
cause that explains the source of change within a substance or 
how the substance came to be; and 4) A final or teleological cause 
comprising the ‘end’ of a substance, or what the substance is 
for).1 For instance, Aristotle would cite the material cause of a 
pen to be its plastic and ink, the formal cause to be the essential 
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properties of the pen e.g. its shape, the efficient cause to be the 
machine that made the pen, and the final cause to be what the 
pen is for—to write. It is worth noting that, according to Aristo-
tle, the final cause would not be man-made as appears in the 
above example, in which the pen’s final cause is designated by a 
human mind. Rather, the final cause would rely on the form of 
the substance; therefore, the end of a substance would be to ex-
hibit its essential nature—“the form must be what things are 
for.”1 This statement embodies what I call the functional argu-
ment and appears to resolve concerns that have plagued Aristo-
tle’s concept of essence thus far. Some might say that we now 
have a means both epistemically objective and universal by 
which to identify essential properties: first, determine what a 
substance is for; next, determine the form of the substance and its 
essential properties. 
 However, I reply that Aristotle’s explanation in fact does lit-
tle good. According to Aristotle, the essence must inform the fi-
nal cause of a substance that we had hoped, via the functional 
argument, to inform its essence. What is he to do who knows nei-
ther the formal cause nor final cause of a novel substance? Once 
again, we are led to the question of how we empirically deter-
mine a substance’s form or essential properties given no tools but 
observation. Aristotle might offer a second clarifying statement 
that an essential property is that which allows the substance to 
be a flourishing exemplar of its type—to be excellent. After all, 
according to him, “by ‘end’ we mean not every terminus but on-
ly the best one.”1 Unfortunately, this raises the further question 
as to how we should understand the term ‘excellent,’ especially 
in treatment of non-living substances where survival and repro-
duction cannot play a part. For instance, imagine that an early 
human happens across a sharpened pencil. He has never seen 
this particular object before, but he knows of objects close in ap-
pearance: spears and knives, for instance. The pencil is sharp; it 
is made of woody material. To the early human, the pencil’s ex-
cellent ‘end’ is that of a weapon, and he distinguishes essential 
properties as those contributing to that end. That the pencil 
writes is irrelevant and is thus deemed an accidental property.  
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Thus, even if an epistemically objective fact of the matter exists 
and the early human is wrong, how is he to know he is wrong? 
We may conclude that the functional argument too fails to ad-
dress the epistemic questions at hand, and problems with the 
statistical and functional views compel us to redefine ‘essential 
property’ in such a way as to circumvent these concerns.  Other-
wise, we may never know the essences of material substances 




 In the previous sections, we questioned the relevance of es-
sential and accidental properties when we struggled to discover 
a means by which to distinguish these two kinds of properties.  
After all, what use is there in defining the essential property as 
that which describes the essence of a substance, and the acci-
dental property as that which does not, if the distinction offers 
no clarity in application? One might advocate that we adopt 
some sort of relativism in which the essence of a substance is 
simply that which one arbitrarily decides it to be. Thus, we could 
resolve our quandary by trivializing the distinction between es-
sential and accidental properties such that any properties could 
be legitimately ascribed to one substance, even those which con-
tradicted each other i.e. if both purple and black and white were 
deemed essential colorations of the cow, albeit in different con-
texts. However, we need not relinquish all objectivity yet. In this 
section, I propose to avoid the relativist’s claim and save Aristo-
tle’s conception of essential properties by conceiving 1) the form 
or essential nature of a substance to be a psychological descrip-
tion and 2) the essential properties to be those things which com-
prise our psychological descriptions.  This view I shall call the 
conceptual argument, whose purpose I claim will be to interpret 
Aristotle’s categories of property in such a way as to generate a 
plausible reply to the epistemic question. 
 To begin, let us consider what I mean by ‘psychological de-
scriptions.’ First, I imply something more complex than simply 
images which one envisions upon experiencing an evocative trig-
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ger—a word, sound, a smell, or other. These images are highly 
variable; the specific focus and details may differ from person to 
person. I, for instance, upon seeing the word ‘dog’ may envision 
a small, shaggy-haired terrier with a friendly demeanor; on the 
other hand, someone else might conceive a long-legged, growl-
ing hound. However, these two images cannot both in their en-
tirety represent the essential nature of the dog. Otherwise, we 
might have an infinite number of essential natures rather than 
only one, a problem if we define essential properties to be those 
properties necessarily belonging to a substance. That both psy-
chological images—both of the terrier and of the hound—are 
evoked by the word ‘dog’ must imply that both images share 
something in common, a framework of sorts comprising key ele-
ments or essential properties of the substance ‘dog,’ especially 
since we are not unlimited in the kinds of psychological images 
that we conceive: we do not envision a tree, for instance, upon 
experiencing a ‘dog’ trigger. Consequently, I propose that if we 
desire to know the essential natures of substances, we need only 
determine the frameworks of essential properties that compose 
our psychological images and allow us to recognize the substanc-
es as such—these frameworks I will refer to as our psychological 
descriptions of substances. 
 In the meantime, one might ask how my formulation of es-
sential properties surpasses the functional argument. After all, 
are we not obliged to recognize the substance before we can de-
scribe it and to describe the substance before we can recognize it? 
To this question of circularity, I reply “no” for the following rea-
son: unlike Aristotle’s functional argument, which offers no 
means to determine a substance’s final cause and thereby es-
sence, I do suggest an empirical method through which to obtain 
the psychological description of a substance. Consider this: upon 
encountering a dog, I unconsciously compare my image of a 
shaggy-haired terrier to the subject before me. While I will con-
sciously note certain differences in details—size, shape, color, 
demeanor—I will still instinctively and almost immediately con-
clude that the substance before me is a dog because the new sub-
stance meets certain criteria that I have set, given my psychologi-
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cal description of a dog. If I encounter a tree, I will unlikely deem 
it a dog simply because the tree does not meet the criteria set by 
my psychological description. Therefore, if I desire to know my 
psychological description of the dog, I need only be presented 
with enough counter-cases to determine which features of the 
dog are necessary for me to judge a substance to be a dog. For 
instance, let us imagine a simple experiment where a subject who 
possesses a psychological description of a dog is shown various 
images. For every image he considers to be an accurate represen-
tation of a ‘dog,’ he must quickly respond ‘yes,’ and for every 
image that he does not consider a ‘dog,’ he must quickly respond 
‘no.’ If shown a picture of a tree, we may assume that he will re-
spond ‘no’ for various reasons: a tree is not an animal; a tree is 
not four-legged; a tree has no face. In addition, if shown an im-
age of a cat, we may assume that he will respond ‘no,’ but for 
different reasons: a cat is smaller; a cat has sharper retractable 
claws. Note that the subject is not usually conscious of these dif-
ferences; rather, he answers based on a ‘gut’ reaction—an intui-
tion of what is a dog. Nonetheless, from his responses, we may 
glean the essential properties ascribed to the dog by comparing 
the various images he rejects to those he accepts and identifying 
differences, increasingly specific as the images grow closer in 
likeness to the object in question. I do not claim that this method 
will give us the exact boundaries at which substances teeter into 
the category of ‘dog.’ It will, however, allow us an empirical 
means by which to somewhat clearly glean the essential proper-
ties of substances without succumbing to circularity or total arbi-
trariness.  
 At this point, I may receive the following response from the 
relativist camp: are not psychological descriptions subject to vari-
ous situational influences, given that they originate within the 
mind and appear to be products of human invention? Does that 
not imply some sort of epistemic subjectivity to what we deem 
essential properties of substances? If so, is not Aristotle’s distinc-
tion between essential and accidental properties once again sub-
ject to doubt? 
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 My response comes in two parts. First, I agree that the con-
ceptual argument allows for greater subjectivity than Aristotle 
would like. To understand why, let us look again at the cow ex-
ample, first mentioned in section 1 of this paper, and examine 
how psychological descriptions come to be. Recall that, following 
the aforementioned disaster, only purple cows exist. Now imag-
ine that a person who has never seen or known a cow before and 
has no psychological description of cows               desires to know 
what a cow is. When his guide points to the purple cow and tells 
him that it is a cow, he will at first have no psychological image 
with which to compare the substance before him. At that time, 
there will be no essential properties of cows to him, only acci-
dental properties, and he will simply have to believe his guide. 
Following this, imagine that he returns to the island several 
times and is told again and again that various individual purple 
cows are cows. Most likely, after repeated instances, the person 
will not be able to divorce the substance ‘cow’ from the color 
‘purple.’ In this case, as Aristotle said, A will appear to necessari-
ly belong to B, and purple will be known as an essential property 
of the cow to the person by virtue of his acquired psychological 
description. Statistical probability would thus, in this way, play a 
part in the development of one’s psychological description. 
However, imagine that the person desired to know the cow be-
fore the disaster and before anyone was aware that purple cows 
existed on the island. In these circumstances, the guide would 
point to a black-and-white cow instead, the person would come 
to consider black-and-white as an essential property of the cow, 
and we would, it would appear, obtain mutually exclusive con-
clusions. In this sense, I would agree that what we deem to be 
essential properties would vary by context. 
 However, note that in order for the person who has no psy-
chological descriptions to discover the cow, he must have a 
guide who already possesses a psychological description. The 
task would have proven near impossible to the person, upon ar-
riving on the island with no knowledge, to determine alone 
which substance was the cow. As a result, we may conclude that 
psychological descriptions depend not only upon epistemic con-
15 
Helen Zhao 16 
ditions, but also upon the psychological descriptions already 
adopted. Likewise, properties deemed essential at the present 
depend upon existing beliefs of what is essential. Thus, essential 
properties admit of relativity from a global perspective, external 
to the framework of what is socially deemed essential, given that 
frameworks vary by setting. However, within frameworks, our 
psychological descriptions remain somewhat objective due to 
shared psychological descriptions, largely bound by our social 




 In response to the question of how we distinguish essential 
properties from accidental properties, I reply that essential prop-
erties are features crucial to our psychological descriptions of 
substances, whereas accidental properties are not. As a result, 
given the variability of our descriptions, it would appear that 
differences between substances—while not entirely arbitrary—
are neither as deep and objective, nor are the methods by which 
we determine the essentiality of their properties as simple, as Ar-
istotle might have supposed. However, in order that we may 
continue to understand how our concepts arise, further work in 
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1. Terrence Irwin, and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Introductory Read-
ings, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996). 
2. It has been brought to my attention ex post facto that the 
‘psychological description’ mentioned in my paper corre-
sponds to a term in the literature, namely ‘cognitive schema.’ 
According to the Charles T. Schmidt, Jr. Labor Research Cen-
ter, a cognitive schema constitutes the “organization of 
knowledge about a particular concept.” In addition, 
‘consensual schemas’—much like my ‘shared psychological 
descriptions’—develop when members of a group adopt 
“fairly similar mental models” to facilitate group interac-
tions. To be clear, my paper did and does not purport to 
identify novel cognitive phenomena. Rather, its main pur-
pose is to stress the crucial roles that such phenomena play 
in our epistemic endeavors, particularly with relation to the 
understanding of material objects, which Aristotle had in 
mind. 
